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would like to correct  
this interview before any use is made  
of it in historical writing.

STATINTL

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to be 'Ja' or similar, written in a cursive style.

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STATINTL

*INTERVIEW*

Monday, September 24, 1973

Interview with [redacted] - 2G40 Headquarters

Interviewer: [redacted]

A: Dave, our interest [redacted] today [redacted] 25X1  
in 25X1

[redacted] is/your briefing with General Smith of President Truman each Friday morning, and one of the first questions, of course, would be: when did General Smith begin this practice of briefing President Truman every week?

D: Well, Fred, you know we talked about this a little bit the other day, kind of as a backup to it. Do you remember exactly when General Smith came into the Agency?

A: Not the exact date, but I'm sure it was October of 1950.

D: October of 1950. Well, as I recall, I think June 1950, when the Korean War started--I guess Admiral Hillenkoetter was here then--so, as a result of the war still going on--it's my understanding this started almost immediately when General Smith took over.

A: I see.

D: our briefing of the President. I think Admiral Hillenkoetter briefed on Friday morning, as did General Smith, as I understand it.

A: Oh, I see. So this practice may have started perhaps with the Korean War?

D: I think the emphasis on an every Friday morning briefing was heightened; it was emphasized by the Korean War. That is, more White House interest on what had been going on.

A: In other words, it might not have been weekly before that, but just perhaps less frequently.

D: This is all hearsay and I just...after the Korean War when we got into it, of course, we were so busy where we were and we were part of ORE then, of course, /as you will recall, we had mainly the COMINT part of OER, which was kind of-- of ORE I mean--which was kind of cut off from the other parts.

A: A general division...

D: Right. And we were so damned busy down there, I don't know, it just seemed like we just started briefing Bedell Smith and he was going to the White House and I really hadn't checked back.

A: Well, did you get involved with General Smith's briefings practically as soon as he began them himself?

D: Almost within weeks. Maybe a month or so. I would say weeks, probably earlier. Because he was trying, himself, to carry out what this group had come down to...I guess the President had invited this group to look over CIA and to make recommendations for reorganization which would make it more applicable to White House use and consumption of intelligence. As you know, President Truman--I guess until

(D) the day he died--was very proud of CIA; every chance he got he said, "I set this thing up, you know." Before this the President was getting information from all Agencies and Departments of government and, as he would say, "The President sat there and had to put'em all together himself." And he was very proud of this and I'm sure had given General Smith, whom he had picked personally for the job, had given him, I am sure, the most emphatic directions to make the intelligence so that it could be, well, what Central Intelligence Agency was set up for: get it from all sources, put it together, and bring it to him more or less in a package, to President Truman.

A: Do you know anything about how the briefing arrangement came about, if it didn't actually begin with Hillenkoetter? I mean, would it have come about through the Director proposing a weekly briefing, or through the President asking for one? Did you ever hear anything about that?

D: Fred, specifically I don't know how this came about; but I do know, I think, why it came about. As you know, the National Security Council, as I remember it, met on either Wednesday or Thursday and, naturally, this was a pretty select group. The Cabinet met every Friday under Truman and I understand this was pretty regular...he got his Cabinet together. So even though the Director of Central Intelligence, not a member of the NSC but as an advisor and consultant to it, had already met perhaps with the President and with that group on

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- (D) Wednesday or Thursday, I think it was just the personal interest in President Truman that he wanted a face-to-face, eyeball meeting with just two or three people on Friday morning to get up on the world situation before his big Cabinet meeting. Now we are told that he did not...well, I was told that he never passed on everything he got there. For example, he was extremely security-minded. If there had been any COMINT or SIGINT kind of information, he certainly would not have passed that on as a source, but it did give him a big background and he used his Cabinet very effectively, I would say, as a big background to kind of keep them up on the world situation.
- A: A sounding board, too...
- D: Yes; how he sanitized this information, I don't know...
- A: In other words, he really briefed them in turn a little bit before they had a discussion on things?
- D: That is right. Fred, on that last point...we may be getting ahead of ourselves--but I think it interesting to note that after Eisenhower took over, these friday briefings were knocked off. Just to show you a little bit how all Presidents handle things differently--which they certainly have a right to do. General Eisenhower was kind of a type of a committeeman, or staffman, and his point, when this was put to him of how he wanted the Central Intelligence briefings, he said, "I would much rather have it at the NSC-level so all my staff

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(D) and all of us can hear the same thing each time rather than to have a personal briefing." This had been done under Mr. Truman. So that's what evolved later when the first item--now this is under Eisenhower--the first item on each weekly meeting of the National Security Council was a current intelligence briefing by the Director of Central Intelligence which, in effect, did get all of them up to date on the most crucial items or significant items that happened that week. Now the Director soon found that he was built into those briefings...a little more emphasis on, say, problems that he knew were on the National Security Agenda which would follow his briefing. In other words, if they <sup>were</sup> ~~were~~ worrying about the prospects of a Middle East development and this was number three on the Agenda, and they were going into this as a policy matter, naturally the Director would put a little more meat on the Middle East bone that week, you see.

A: Sure; then I suppose at times there were even particular briefings on single subjects, although rarely, I suppose.

D: Yes, right, absolutely. This is then when he would bring in...several times I have helped staff out getting people for special briefings. As a matter of fact, we did this with President Truman--not often--but sometimes General Smith would say, "Maybe we'd better follow through and have a real complete briefing on this (one given subject)."

A: Do you know whether General Smith briefed these meetings of the National Security Council under Truman, as well as talking to the President?

D: No; he did not. He came...item one would be just whatever was going to be discussed from policy viewpoint.

A: I see. But General Smith was there?

D: Right, he was absolutely there. And then, of course, he would have a lot of background information on each of the items which might bring it up to current. But he would not get up and give a 15 or 20-minute scheduled briefing. For example, under Eisenhower, since we are comparing the two rather quickly, anybody making up the Agenda of a National Security Council meeting (it) would be number one: current briefing by the Director of central Intelligence--or assessment of the world situation, or whatever it might be. He could say anything he wanted (ot), really. It was his own choice. Now, of course, being an old Agency hand for so long, and the old school tie, I thought about this at the time and some years later. I believe that the real eyeball, eye-to-eye, face-to-face meeting with the President in his office, all the way from 30 minutes to two hours every Friday morning, was well worthwhile and I am sorry it didn't carry on through. *further.*

A: How did this usually work? Was this held in the President's Oval Office?



A: Yes, it was; in the White House.

D: And who would be present?

A: Every week Admiral <sup>O</sup>Sauers, representing the National Security Council, Admiral Dennison, who was the President's main military aide-intelligence man--Admiral Dennison handled all the sensitive material, both SIGINT and operational for the President--and then, in addition to that, there was Jimmy Lay who was Executive Secretary to the National Security Council. So almost every week there were these four people, and if any dropped out or who couldn't go, it would generally be Admiral Dennison, but almost in every case, except rare cases, there would be General Smith, Admiral Sauers, and Jimmy Lay, who would go in and brief the President. Now I would stay outside and would be called in occasionally to verify a point or give them a little more information and they would be seated around the President's desk.

A: I see. This is all in the setting of that photograph in the book, Mr. President where they have the intelligence page I think, as you refer to it, where they have these --just men pictured/exactly these men with the caption saying, "These are the President's cloak and dagger boys."

D: I think that's right.

A: That is in that room?

D: I think you are right, Fred.

A: It has a big globe.

- D: Yes, there is one there of the Cabinet. And I'm not sure although it's over on the desk there, but I'm not sure; but that is it. These four people were, I suppose, considered his most...well, his confidants.
- A: As a matter of fact, now, that I think about it, Admiral Sauers is not in that picture. It is just the President, Bedell Smith, Admiral Dennison, and Jimmy Lay.
- D: He might not have been there that day.
- A: Yes. And then, of course, there is the fact that Admiral Sauers was the first Executive Secretary of the NSC and I guess Jimmy Lay <sup>was</sup> ~~was~~ his assistant at that time, but then Admiral Sauers didn't stay too long, did he, before he left and then Jimmy Lay became Executive Secretary. So this picture may have been made after Sauers left. I don't remember the exact date.
- D: That's probably true.
- A: Well, you say these briefings could run anywhere between a half (hour and two hours) (?).
- D: Yes, they run...I don't know; maybe the President might have been interrupted during that period of time or something, but they generally lasted between 30 and 45 minutes I'd say, maybe less than an hour.
- A: Did you usually bring graphics for this?
- D: Yes; we almost always brought a fairly large Korean map which showed the kind of--the military balance of forces in Korea and that portion of China, and then we had another map which covered the Soviet Far East and China. We kept

(D) those very much up to date.

A: Were these used on an easel or did you just use them as lap maps?

✓ D: No. We had a tremendously (large briefcase specially made. I suppose it was) as big as this desk, not quite as big as this desk top.

A: Yes, I think I remember seeing it.

D: Yes, it's probably still around somewhere.

A: So you simply set them up on a table?

✓ D: We did, and we had...oh, there was another thing we also took along with us a little lap map--we called it...the Graphic boys did. Now this covered, as I recall it, the Soviet Far East and Korea. It was on a large enough scale that it could be set down on his desk. Now we would always bring the big map back with us, but sometimes (we would leave the small one. We had two sets of them. And they would be working on one set this week and) get one or another. It made it very easy to keep up to date.

A: Well, as far as the participants from CIA are concerned, you and General Smith were the only two who went over there, or did the Graphics people go with you, or did you carry the graphics?

✓ D: To White House briefings? That was really my excuse for going...was to carry the material. But as I told you the other day, General Smith was very uncomfortable (with somebody, as he called it, toting the bags that didn't know everything inside it. He just liked to double that way... the person who was his bag toter should also know the  
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(D) contents of it.) It was kind of funny sometimes--he was kind of a short man, and this was a big briefcase. When he was ready to leave, either from the building at CIA, or from the White House back, you had to watch him. He would grab that briefcase and I would find myself running along here with nothing in hand. I'd have no excuse of going. But he wouldn't hesitate to call me in if he needed to elucidate a point. Now it wasn't often that General Smith needed that. I always felt that, with all due respect to him, that this was just a little bit of staging sometimes. And I can give you a good example of this; I don't know how much you want to get into this thing but...

A: Oh, I like examples.

D: Part of our job up there during the year and a half or so that I was involved briefing Congressional Committees, was this same kind of thing. We would help him get ready. Now when I say we, actually all of OCI, ONE, or anyone else behind this, and the General had a briefing before going, in which we would recommend who would come in or whatever. He would generally take our recommendation. And he would be thoroughly briefed, to the extent that he wanted to be; sometimes he would cut it off and say, "I don't want any more of that." But, I remember one time going to a Congressional briefing--we were dealing with an awful lot of figures and as I remember it was an Appropriations Subcommittee. We were in the back seat of this limousine and we were looking at the material--he was--and he turned to

(D) me and--I think it was an Order of Battle in Korea and don't hold me to these figures; I'm sure they're wrong, but I'm going to give them to you as an example. General Smith looked over to me and said, "Now this is the latest estimate of the Chinese forces in Korea," and let's just say it was 488,000, or thereabouts. And I said, "Yes, sir; that's it, as of this morning." So he just looked at me and said, "Now remember that figure. Would you do that?" Yes, sir!" So we went <sup>on</sup> over and a few minutes later when he was throwing figures around--he often didn't even refer to notes--I sat behind him with these books in hand. I had a copy of them just like he did and I would try to keep up with him--turning them. So he had thrown a lot of figures around. So, after a while he came to this figure and said, "Now I would say around 490,000 Chinese troops are in there now..." and suddenly he turned around to me and said, "Is that about our estimate there now?" And I said, "Yes, sir; the figure is actually 488,800." Bedell shrugged and said, "See..." or something like that. The whole point, I think, was he had thrown so many figures around that this verified to the Congress he knew what the hell he was talking about. Now he pulled that same old trick--never told me what it was; I just picked it up fortunately, I guess--but every once in a while he would say, "Now remember that figure," and I knew what was coming. So I think maybe that is the reason

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(D) he would...although there were some kind of technical Order of Battle statements that I might answer a yes or no and just leave. I believe he would say that was okay or something. And then occasionally I would sit and hear him banter around a little bit. He was always in charge. That's what I'm trying to say.

A: I can see that! What materials did Bedell Smith take with him to brief from at the White House and, in fact, how did he utilize the materials? Did he show them to the President to have the President read or did he read to the President from them, or did he simply talk the thing and referring occasionally to some of his printed materials? You know how he operated?

D: Now, Fred, as we have said here before, I went with him. We went by the receptionist and then we went into this little outer room and when you were there, you were supposed to be there to see the President. It was just an anteroom before the Oval Office. I don't know whether it is still there or not.

A: There is one room there. It is between the Oval Office and the Cabinet Room.

D: So, we would go about 30 minutes ahead of time, sit down, and generally Bedell Smith would get together with whomever was going in with him...whether it was Admiral Sauers, or Jimmy Lay, or Admiral Dennison, and they would have a little

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(D) yack session and I would get in on this quite a bit. Actually, I think General Smith was telling them about what he was going to tell the President. I can say I did not, on any occasion, go in with them initially. Now whether they went in and gave him the "code" as we call it--the Black Book--whether they said, "This was it," and how they started the briefings, I don't know. I was always called in after it started, if I was called in. Now, that's not answering your question, but what went into this book--we selected it ourselves and, of course, as any briefings are on a regular basis, the briefee, or the one you are briefing, rather gets used to it, too. When we would give him, say, the Situation Summary every week, and he liked it, well, he expected that every week. But otherwise we could put in the book just...miscellaneous...or in the back section--just about anything we wanted to. So now we are getting down to what he was briefed on.

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When the Situation Summary came along, which we down in General Division-- & Company--wrote, and we purposely didn't start writing this until Thursday afternoon because it was going to be a Friday morning briefing and this was before even I started going with General Smith to the White House. We would do up around 9 o'clock and brief him on the Situation Summary, calling to his attention the important things that happened this week as compared to last

(D) week. We would also take with (us/him) the General Order of Battle Situation and any changes. We would take any economic changes and generally these were, of course, right in the book. And that's what the Situation Summary was. It was really tailor-made and written for that Friday morning briefing. Now, if any real good cables came from the field, we would throw those in there. After the Watch Committee started, we would put the Watch Committee Report in. And we would also put

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The little trick we used was: we put the Watch Committee Report on the lefthand side, that is, the Summary Page--we put the holes on this side, and on the righthand side with holes on its left side, so that when he opened it up he could actually compare them across the notebook.

Generally they were quite compatible



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D: I don't think it had at that point, Fred.

A: Now, also, we would leave any operational stuff, that is, from what is now the DDO or DDP or the Operational Division. General Smith would generally take that separately. The Black Book was...I guess we could just make this statement: it was an intelligence analysis book. Now I told you a while ago in all due honesty that I did not know how much was really discussed or called to the President's attention from that book, but I do know this: that General Smith always left it with the President and he kept it one week. We would come back the following week and General Smith would give him the new one and we would bring the old one back.

A: I see. That's very revealing, I think, because probably knowing Truman he did go through the book during the week.

D: Well, there's a little personal interest story on that. Now back to--this may be an example of how the President--President Truman--was very security-minded. At one point during this time, and I think it was at the end of his administration or the end of his tenure of office. We did not have a scheduled briefing on Friday, one Friday, because the President was out at Walter Reed getting a check-up, and he didn't get many...Truman didn't. At around 11:00 or 12:00, I got a call from Roberta <sup>B</sup> Harris in the White House. The President had called from his suite of

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(D) rooms at Walter Reed and said, "Miss Barris, I can't remember his name now, but he's kind of a southern-talking guy that comes over with Bedell Smith and I know Bedell Smith is out of town...would you get in touch with him at CIA and have him come over and get that Black Book out of my bedroom, It's sitting right on the table--I mean it is sitting right on this table right by by bed--first drawer up, and get it back to him, because, for Heaven's sake, I don't want to leave it there a week." So I tooted off over there and I went up on the second floor into the bedroom. I waited until they went in and came out, and here--this was, <sup>not</sup> ~~was~~ Roberta Barris, his own secretary, but another secretary--one whom I had <sup>d</sup> never met really...an older person... and I remember she made two trips out and one was not it. She came back and, sure enough, here it was, COMINT and everything else--just sitting there <sup>maybe</sup>...that was where he kept it all week as far as I know. But the bang I got out of it was that he took time out to remember this.

A: Sure, sure. Then he remembered your accent!

D: Yes.

(End of Tape 1, Side 1)

Tape 1, Side 2

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25X1

D. But, as I recall, [REDACTED] I believe, was head of all

DD/P [REDACTED] as I recall.

A. He was senior Agency rep for years, wasn't he?

D. That's what it was, as I recall. He put out kind of a weekly cable to the Director, and if I'm not \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

first of the weeks, and we asked that it be at the expense of not getting it, we asked that he delay it another day ~~xx~~ so that it would be <sup>more</sup> ~~xxx~~ in keeping with the end of the week. So I think we started getting that cable Thursday. \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

more in keeping with the President's briefing. \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

blockade of 1948. \_\_\_\_\_ Moscow \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

---blank for several minutes---

- D. ....and General Smith was called back here several times and talked to the President, so I think this is...well, of course, during the war, too, when Truman and Ike were great friends, back then, and Bedell was a part of that before they got to be political enemies.
- A. Then, during this period, at least after January or February of 1951, after the CIB got into production....We assume the CIB was going to the White House and the President was reading that, and Bedell Smith didn't have to worry about carrying that, but later in the year the Weekly Review began. What happened at that time of the Weekly Review? Did ~~XXXXXX~~ General Smith take that with him? ~~XX~~ then, on Friday nights, as part of his briefing materials?
- D. Well, as I recall we never did. Now, I believe that went over....the CIB, when did it come in?
- A. 28 February '51.
- D. February of '51. The CIB, although occasionally I would be called in to troubleshoot on why it wasn't over there, was ~~XXXXXX~~ handled so efficiently with OCI...it was just a routine morning happening that it worked so smoothly. It was just two or three times/<sup>out of</sup>the whole time I was up there was I ever called on to want to know what happened to the CIB. But it went over there and I know the President

(D) read it.

25X1 A. Do you have any idea how it got to the White House? I asked Jimmy Lay [ ] who delivered the CIB to the [ ] and he said he didn't know.

D. I don't know either, Fred, ~~and~~ I don't remember. I don't know, I really don't know, as I said I think [ ] was handling that at the time, at the time/ <sup>that</sup> routine was set up. I believe it was handled by the regular OCI courier that made rounds....

A. Yes, I would imagine ~~so~~.

D. I recall we tried several things before the CIB <sup>was</sup> accepted again and that/was then working down in <sup>ORE</sup> and General Division and this kind of thing. First of all we wanted it to be all-source, and General Smith <sup>had</sup> said that had to be something like the Situation Summary, to be a daily thing, because ...you also probably remember that one of the big things General Smith did when he got to the Agency was to set up a cable secretariat for himself. And this guy was located <sup>in</sup> over/the pool complex. [ ] These

25X1 mainly, true enough, were aimed at CIA incoming cables. <sup>or</sup> Bedell couldn't find them sometimes, /couldn't trace them down, somebody told him something about it, or if he was personally involved in sending a cable out that he wanted a back response/on, what he asked questions about...sometimes it

(D) it would go astray. So he set this cable secretariat up, pulled in a Major...from God knows where...I think he was in Europe or somewhere, but he called the Joint Chiefs of Staff and had this guy come back, who ran the cable secretariat for him and General Eisenhower, during the later parts of the war. And, boy, everything that came into the Agency came through that one guy. I'll think of his name in a minute. But, it was this that said he this kind of thing, General Smith felt the President might be missing. I mean that kind of arrangement where the most important things, now somebody would know precisely...I'm not talking about CIA now, but it was ~~xxxx~~ this kind of thing...community-wide, said that he/~~xxxx~~ <sup>ought</sup> there ~~should~~ be a daily briefing sheet going to the President, to serve the President, like he wanted to be served in CIA operations...a centralized ....a Central Intelligence daily. <sup>that's what it amounted to</sup> And as you know, here, I have a copy of this thing here where President Truman was in Key West in March, and wrote back, "I've just read your Intelligence Bulletin and I think you've hit the jackpot on this."

- A. That's right. Famous commendation, I gather. We're going to run a copy of that in  history of OCI. STATINTL
- D. The original ought to be around here somewhere. My heavens, (not) a good copy, <sup>here it is...</sup>...somebody up there thought enough of us to make copies for all of us who contributed, made copies and sent them to us.

- A. Very good.

- A. Well, then, in other words, you don't think the Weekly was sent over...that, in other words, went by courier, just like the CIB did...
- D. Right, yes. But you see, the Situation Summary now --we got an awful lot of feedback from Bedell Smith on the Situation Summary. If he had been briefed by somebody or had read the newspaper Thursday night; and Friday morning we would sit and let him leaf through the book, and he would say, "Where's this thing that supposedly happened last night?" And sometimes we found ourselves working all night on that Situation Summary. Now this is what he thought the President would want. Occasionally we did get some feedback from the President.
- A. Through Bedell Smith or otherwise?
- D. Yes. I've never forgotten this story. Coming back from the White House one time with General Smith...we got in and we started down Pennsylvania Avenue back to the Agency. General Smith kind of shook his head and he said, "I'll tell you, that man never fails to amaze me. The memory he's got. I just can't (have any?) ." So I said, "What's that, General Smith?" "Well," he said, "this morning when I brought the CIB in..." Now, yes, this is an example-- I guess he read it while we were there, Fred...you asked me a while ago...he said, he looked at this item and he said,



- (D) "Now, Bedell, two weeks ago, he said...blah, blah, blah... it was on page 10 and it's different from this." ~~Now~~ Well General Smith, he said, "I just crouched in the dark and said a few things....(this is General Smith talking) and he said "We're going to go back now,"but he said, "I've done this before...hadn't even told you...and he's always been right on the penny." ~~My~~ <sup>how</sup> My God, if I knew/he had this kind of memory." So we moved on a little bit, a couple of blocks, and I turned around to General Smith and I said, "General Smith, I might be able to answer your question on the President if you'd answer one for me." He said, "What's that?" I said, "How the hell do you have such a good memory that you're always needling us about something that happened two weeks ago?" Which he did.
- A. He had a phenomenal memory, didn't he?
- D. Oh, yes. This is a great \_\_\_\_\_. "So," he said, "I guess you just better move on back, ~~doesn't~~ it?" Well, now we went home and sure enough, whatever page it was, it was right there, and there was a little different slant to the story. Well, he was a great one. So that kind of feed-back we would get. Now, again, General Smith would come back, and I would need to have a pad ready and he would say, "Now look, we've got to do this next week, or maybe when I get back over there remind me we're going to call

(D) so and so." And sometimes it would go back that afternoon... a question...and sometimes we would build it into next week's Situation Summary. Now, somewhere, Fred, those contents ...the contents of what we called the Black Book...and a copy of it is right here. I can show you. It says: The President. Later on, somebody didn't like this and they put: For The President, The Central Intelligence Agency. Just a plain old ersatz leather notebook...and that's the type of thing that went.

Now, I'll put it back up there. They gave me this when I left up there...as a memento. I guess it belongs to the Agency, but I am going to take it home with me when I leave. But it's a picture of the one...I don't know whether there's a picture of the President over there, the book Mr. President, but...

- A. I don't think there's a picture. He refers to it in his inscription to you.
- D. I know that one of the pictures that Bedell Smith had...that this was on his desk, one of his official pictures as Director of CIA--not Director of CIA, excuse me, Director of Central Intelligence. He always made a great distinction, as we should.
- A. Yes, sure. Now, this briefing system lasted then throughout Truman's time, in other words, until the 19th of January 1953?

- D. Yes, it did. I think we had one just about less than a week before he left--up to the last minute.
- A. To the previous Friday.
- D. I don't think they last that long, and, of course, like anybody else, they started the outside offices; it was quite evident they were going getting ready to move out--paraphernalia was going here and there, this kind of thing.
- A. Let me see now...did we have any other topics that particularly struck you, beside Korea? That was the chief topic we were evidently doing this time, but because Korea was still going after Eisenhower took over.
- D. Well, the Middle East. This was before Mossadegh--I recall this with the Presidential candidate briefings was quite on the top of the list--the whole Middle Eastern affair. Oil, of course, was always a problem. [REDACTED] 25X1
- [REDACTED] 25X1
- [REDACTED] That kind of thing. And, 25X1
- incidentally, little operational things like that--the President was quite interested in. General Smith would take those along. [REDACTED] 25X1
- [REDACTED]

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I gave it to General Smith and he laughed and said, "I can't give this to the President. Let's erase this, because I want to take it." So we erased it. But you could still see where it had been written. So Harry Truman's bright eye read through this thing and he saw what had been rubbed out and he laughed like hell, and we could even hear him out the other side of the room. So on the way out General Smith said, "He saw what you didn't erase. Maybe it was more effective that way than if we had written it down."

- A. Yes, probably it was.
- D. I don't know how many cocktail parties...or things like that... but it wasn't good security.
- A. Yes, I suppose; but those things do happen don't they?
- D. He had a great sense of humor.
- A. I suppose sometimes when Bedell Smith couldn't make this Friday morning date, Allen Dulles took his place, is that right?
- D. Yes, absolutely.
- A. Yes, because Allen was the Deputy at that time.
- D. Yes; I suppose we went over there with Mr. Dulles, maybe two or three weeks like this right after Ike took over; but It was changed almost immediately. <sup>C.D.</sup> ~~Seedy~~ Jackson was the man behind this; of course, this was after General Smith had been appointed Under secretary of State under Eisenhower and moved away, and Allen Dulles became our Director. Oh, Mr. Dulles went, not frequently, but, you know, he had to have a

a pretty good reason not to brief the President weekly; Bedell tried to make it as much as he could, but sometimes he was on a trip, or something, and would tell the President ahead of time that he wouldn't be there.

- A. Well, I understood from something that the system worked a little differently on these occasions when Dulles substituted. Didn't he have a larger preparatory briefing for himself than Smith usually did?
- D. Yes, he did. He was quite...well, I'll put it this way. Probably the personal rapport was not quite as good. Of course, General Smith had been doing this--if he hadn't been doing it for sometime, he set it up and did it the way he would have wanted to do it, he and the President. So Mr. Dulles generally would have--I'd say, cheat, and have notes along the side on what he was going to talk on. So that his briefing--that was a little more elaborate. For each meeting he would have, as I recall, just about every division chief from OCI might be involved, or one of their representatives--whatever the problem...
- A. In other words, he worked it pretty much as he did after he became DCI.
- D. Very similar; I would say so.
- A. Get the whole gang up in his room and go through the whole thing.
- STATINTL D. Yes, and that's one thing about--General Smith, he got used to [redacted] and me pretty much, [redacted]--in giving STATINTL his pre-briefing. He thought, I suppose, whatever we didn't know, he was so used to it, we would get it for him.

Now, Mr. Dulles, on the other hand, you made brownie points for yourself to bring along ex<sup>per</sup>ts. As I told you the other day, ~~he~~ it has been my theory all along ...bring along somebody. Of course, Mr. Dulles loved this. Four, five, six, eight people in a room didn't bother him at all. As a matter of fact, he had more ~~a~~ people to tell stories to *every man in a while*

- A. Well, your pre-briefing of General Smith, you did this every Friday morning before you went to the White House, or was it done on <sup>the</sup> ~~a~~ Thursday?
- D. Oh, yes. I'm kind of mixing things up here. We really started briefing General Smith directly for his White House briefings on that famous 1 December 1950 special briefing that the President called at the White House ...I guess it was eleven in the morning, <sup>where he</sup> ~~he~~ had all the leaders of ~~the~~ Congress--both parties--and his top Cabinet people, and General Smith and the Secretary of State and the Chief of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Secretary of Defense did the talking to these people. Now this, of course, was the Chinese Communist ~~people~~ had come in...the Korean thing...and it was quite obvious by <sup>1 December</sup> ~~then by~~ <sup>really</sup> ~~when they started~~...I guess they started in October-November, and there was a lot of hooplah on that...whether the Agency called the shots or not. But it was ~~not~~ <sup>?</sup> evident then they were (in accords?) And after that we started briefing him on a weekly basis, just before he

he went to the White House, after each of those trips.

I guess we kind of...we had what he wanted that way.

A. That morning...that was the time when you [ ] stood STATINTL  
on either side of the easel prepared to answer questions.?

D. That's right. He had called...well, I'm sure he didn't  
get the call to do this himself until sometime that morning.  
I'm not sure what day of the week ~~xxxxxxx~~ this was...whether<sup>it</sup>  
it was on a Friday or whatever, but I think it was on Friday.

So he had to pump himself up, specifically for this. ~~say~~

After all, it was to be a round-up of not only North Korea,  
but China, from whence the Chinese were coming...and then  
the Soviet Union in that part of the world which might

contribute as background, or as a backup I should say, to

Chinese or North Korean troops. ~~KXX~~ Just a general assess-  
ment of the military capability in the area. So we ran

up and briefed him quickly. We didn't have much time

ourselves to get ready for it, but most of it was right off  
the [ ] hip, but apparently it's what he thought he wanted. STATINTL

A. So who briefed him, you and [ ] STATINTL

D. Yes, I think we were the only two that briefed him. [ ] STATINTL  
all the rest of it and I had the military (briefing). And

that's the time, Fred, when I told you before...both [ ]  
I were rather shocked. I had these little 3 x 5 cards/in<sup>that fit</sup>

my pocket and was giving Order of Battle figures and I had

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(D) already made my briefing notes which was about not over two or three cards with one line on it. And when we got through, he said (General Smith said), "You looking at those cards, let me see those cards!" So he took them over, shuffled them around a little bit, and he said, "I'll take these." And then when [ ] I -- he STATINTL told us to meet him at the White House as soon as we could -- he had to run on ahead of time -- so we came on in a car behind him and by the time we got there I think the briefing session had already started. We moved in to the rear of the room. The President was sitting at a table with some of these top people and then the Congressmen were sitting <sup>in chairs</sup> behind us listening to the briefing. And he had already told JJ and me to take a huge map which we had made. And as I told you <sup>a while ago</sup> ~~some time~~ ago, sometime we took this to the White House and some- times we took <sup>along</sup> a "lap" map as we called it. But it was a huge thing, folded, when unfolded quite an impressive --well developed for a roomful of people. So he wanted us to stand on either side of the map and -- with a pointer-- to point at anything he might, some question, somebody might ask a question where this is located, and we were there. And he also said, "Be ready now to expand on any question I might ask you. ~~he said,~~ But ~~don't~~ <sup>don't</sup> say a goddam word till I call on you." So then, what really got both [ ] me was STATINTL

that what was we had told him orally, he almost quoted verbatim to the extent--here  I were standing up there facing this impressive audience and we just had to look across the board at each other--just perfectly quoted. And this kind of shook us. We knew then that our little briefing sessions up there in his office sometimes would go fight on up--just inflections and everything.

STATINTL

- A. This is the time he quoted you about the merging of the military districts in the somewhere or other?
- D. The military districts in the Far East. It had actually happened some three or four years before that in his summary haste to get that across he said, "Now another development, recent development..." I believe he said. And, of course, this went into Harry Truman's Years of Trial and Hope--one of the two volumes of the book, almost verbatim. Well, one of the things Bedell Smith said was that these three military districts had recently been combined under one general.
- A. How was Harry able to put that into his book?
- D. I suppose, Fred, somebody took notes at that meeting.
- A. Someone taking very careful notes, I guess. Probably did not record things in those days, did they?

D. Well, one of the things--Malinovskiy, (who) was incidentally head of one of these military districts in the Far East-- General Smith said to me (this was back in his office before we went) "What kind of a guy is he, capable?" And I said, "General Smith, in my opinion, for whatever that's worth, I think he's one of the best doggone generals the Soviet Union has." Now, when he got to that point in his briefing of the President, and the Cabinet, and the top Congressional people, he said, "Now, heading this outfit is a guy named Malinovskiy, and, in my opinion, for whatever that's worth, he's the best doggone general they've got." Really shook us.

A. So you realized that you had to be careful.

D. We realized then we had an obligation--we had a responsibility.

A. Sure.

STATINTL End of Sid 2 - [ ] interview

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STATINTL Side 3 - [ ] on 24 September 1973

STATINTL

A. But, of the pre-briefing, it was mainly done each week by you, [ ] is that right? Not all of you together, but ~~ga~~ taking turns?

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D. Mostly it was [ ] Sometimes he would say I just want a run down on the military, for example. ~~So then~~  
*Now* so this was before, so to speak, I took up office up there--I was appointed Assistant to the Director in December of '51 and we had been briefing him just about a year to the day before that. Now occasionally [ ]  
[ ] was not there; [ ] was the one I actually, supposedly, replaced, although [ ] was not a substantive man. He doubled as an aide and all this stuff for General Smith. General Smith had brought him with him from New York when he ~~took over as~~ <sup>took over as</sup> DCI. Now ~~when~~ when Hank was not there, one of two things would happen, [ ] who was also kind of the Administrative Assistant to general Smith would go with him or [ ] I would be called/to go. Now, that was before I went up there, NOW when I was assigned up there I started going then, of course, every week. Now this made me--sitting up there, and as I told you the other day, [ ] Fred, being the junior man on the Assistant to the Director's totem pole, I was kind of referred to as General Smith's intelligence in-basket. Everything kind of ~~x~~ funneled through there and I would get it down to him and this kind of thing... [ ] maybe put [ ] little note on it after talking...I could of course talk to anybody in OCI...I had been down there all these years--and I'd call up anybody--get a little

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something to put on a cable or something that might give General Smith a <sup>little</sup> further view into the problem. It was handled very informally. That's the kind of thing that I did every day to him...I probably lost my line of thought there. But the main thing was to keep information going to him in the general line of whatever ~~the~~ the take was in the Agency.

- A. Did this mean that you had to screen a great deal of...
- D. Then, I know what I was going to say...excuse me! I was trying to figure out some dates in there. Now after I moved up there, of course I was getting some of the raw select cables from OCI and other places. But you see then I ~~was~~ kind of lost in the daily touch, so then

[redacted] would generally come up and we would ~~xx~~ sit and talk a little while and all <sup>then</sup> three of us would go down and brief the General before the General and I took off for the White House--that kind of thing. Now if there were any good economic, I think

[redacted] would come at times, [redacted] might <sup>come</sup> ~~handle~~ some political thing, [redacted] would come on his part of the world. All of those, at various times, would come and help out on that Friday morning briefing.

(D) Now here's something I've been meaning to say/..you men- quite a while  
tioned ~~some time~~ <sup>or while</sup> ago about Order of Battle Military. General  
Smith could read economic/political and he thought he was  
a pretty good political technician, and he was, with three  
years in Moscow and, of course, all of this was not military  
in the last phases of the war \_\_\_\_\_. Economics  
he knew something about. But [ ] and I had a STATINTL  
couple of bull sessions about this and this is just about  
the way--the conclusion--we came to. As Director of  
Central Intelligence, General Smith could go to Congressional  
Committee, he could go to the President, almost anywhere he  
was he knew <sup>that</sup> he was identified as a General ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ and  
up, keep  
somehow he wanted to ~~a~~ keep abreast, as well or better than  
the Joint Chiefs of Staff on military items. Now there is  
no question he would defer to the Chief of the Joint Chiefs  
of Staff on giving a strict military briefing. And this  
was often done at special meetings and General Smith would  
~~then~~ <sup>well</sup> come in and then say/I'll try to put this numbers  
together--what it means, you know a 100,000 troops here a  
hundred there. This is what they can do and what they will,  
and ~~a~~ he would pick it up from there. He would go, for  
example, to Congressional Committees, and the accolades  
that were given to opening up a sub-Committee or Committee  
meeting, the Chairman would say, "Well, ladies and gentle-  
men, this morning we are most fortunate to have General

Bedell Smith who's had a most wonderful background in winning the great war in Europe...". You know, just throw it on good. "But now he is with us to tell us about the world situation..." and all this stuff, but every time, somewhere in there, some person, some Congressman, or somebody would say, "Now, General Smith, there's nobody who knows any more about the military situation in the world than you do." This kind of thing; he was always on the front griddle fore. And he kept up; he wanted to do this.

- A. Sure, this was his specialty.
- D. Yes; but he could speak on economics or political just as easily, and did, there's no question about it.
- A. There's one passage in Truman's Memoirs that I wanted to ask you about. On one page he says, "The DCI became, usually, my first caller of the day." And I've never been able to be sure which DCI he had in mind and it never seemed to me at some later stage, say, after the coronation of CIA, as opposed to CIG, that you did have the Director going down to the White House every day. Do you know just what (he means)?
- D. I'm guessing; but I would guess that that was General Smith and I would guess it was telephone. He had a phone directly on his desk...
- A. A caller didn't have to necessarily have to be in person?

- D. No. Now that caller, too, was later on the CIB being down there, but it generally was not that kind of thing. Now, it might be that General Smith would call up and say, "Your morning CIB, page 2, is..." that kind of thing. General Smith was pretty good at security, because we knew those lines were not secure. And they weren't and we worried about this all the time. But, and you remember there was some kind of flap in there somewhere that the General's phone, a CIA phone, had been tapped at one time, and it made a big splash out here. So this made us quite aware that it could be.
- A. You finally got a secure phone to the White House, I gather?
- D. Yes. Before that they were just as open as anything. I have a horrible story to tell later about one of those phone calls from the White House to General Cradley when he was Chief of Staff, but we'll get to that later, when we get up to the Eisenhower era.
- A. Okay. Well...in the diary I think that you kept...
- D. I would guess that was General Smith. I've already said that, but I don't know of anybody who had a more personal touch with Truman than General Smith. I know that Admiral Hellinkoetter didn't have it that



(D) close. And General Smith, you know, was called by Truman effect, to take over, in/~~xxxx~~, begged him to do it--it was right after he had his operation, about half his stomach was removed, that ulcer...and he tried to refuse, ~~and~~ so he said, General Smith, but he just couldn't do it.

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A. This is probably a very small point. In your diary some- time in April of 1952, you talk about a [ ]

D. In my diary...?

A. I think it's in your diary. A [ ] with Allen Dulles who went to the White House to brief on aircraft types, and I just wondered who this [ ] was.

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D. That was one of those special briefings and [ ] was out of OSI...

Oh, I see; this is A. /~~xxxxxx~~ not our famous old [ ] who was head of OBI at one time.

D. Fred, it might well have been. [ ]

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A. [ ]

D. [ ]

I remember this well

because it was one of his greatest moments and later on I got...I think he got back the cover sheet on that and there was nothing on it and I got [ ] to get the President to autograph it for him and he was just walking on cloud 9. It did a helluva good job on him. But it was something to do with, as well as I recall, the

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same old story, whether the US should go into Production of a certain kind of an aircraft to keep up with the Soviets and the President didn't know whether to go along with this or not. He wanted a roundup of inventories of Soviet aircraft and that's what that briefing was all about.

A. Then it was pretty unusual?

D. Yes, it was very unusual. There were few of these. There weren't very many during the whole time, otherwise General Smith would get the briefing and give it himself. But on this one we felt like...I think--to interrupt myself--I ~~think~~ think Mr. Dulles had heard this briefing and he thought it well worth it for the briefer to come himself and do it.

A. On the 12th of August 1952, you accompanied the DCI to a Cabinet briefing. Do you remember that? I think it must have been a fairly unusual situation, and the information I have had no clue as to what this was about. I just wondered...?

D. August '52...?

A. August '52, it would have been in the middle of, more or less, in the middle of the Presidential election campaign that year when you were busy with other things, too.

D. Gee, I just don't remember. Fred, I still think some of papers are [redacted] when I left for [redacted]

the only time I've ever served out of the country was in [redacted] some '61 to '63 <sup>I guess it was,</sup> or '60 to '62, and I left some stuff back here and I would like to get to those papers

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sometime; I'm sure that I made more about it, but you see, August 30th is when we started briefing the Presidential candidates.

A. That's right.

D. So I know we were having problems with the famous/Six Points, what is it, in Korea, you know, and all that stuff. Ike had promised to go to Korea after he was elected, if elected. So I know Korea was very much on top of the thing. Again, the Middle East situation. [REDACTED]

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Mossadegh days, you know...

A. Then, very shortly after President Eisenhower came in, in fact on the 4th of February, you went to visit him, personally, I think, at the White House. Do you remember that occasion?

D. This was the 4th of February?

A. Yes, it would have been about two weeks after he was inaugurated.

D. Yes, this was that famous trip I was about to tell you about a while ago. Well, Fred, you've asked the question, so we'll take on this one now. I had accompanied Bedell Smith to brief the General before...well, as the President-elect, from November 4th to January 20th. But we can get into that later. Now, in February, Mr. Dulles was the Director and he was going to some kind of meeting already scheduled in the Pentagon and we got [REDACTED]

A. [REDACTED]

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(d) "I think the President ought to see this." And he asked me a lot of questions about how this came about and all that stuff. And he said, "I think we ought to take this to the President right away." And he kind of fooled around trying to get whether I had ever seen the President ~~or~~ or not. So I told him I had been briefing...that I had briefed Ike. So he said, "For God's sake, let's go." So we took across--walking on the outside, there's an underground job --but we went on the outside, through the Executive Office Building, through the dark, into the White House back door. And went right on in and in just a matter of minutes here we were right in the President's office. Ike read this thing--when we went in General Cutler was...a very capable man, but he didn't know anything about this...

he called this

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

So we walked in and General Eisenhower looked at me and we were introduced. He sat there a few minutes--now this is a little personal thing on Eisenhower. He kept looking at me and looking at Cutler. Cutler wasn't doing a very good job briefing him on this. So finally-- I have to get this off my chest before I go on with the story--General Eisenhower looked at me and he said, "On the train from Baltimore with Bedell Smith/<sup>weren't you?"</sup> And I said, "Yes, sir." He was trying to get where he had seen me. Well, that was all over. Of course this pleased the daylight's out of me. Cutler didn't know what was going on. So, then

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STATINTL he said, "Now Bobbie, you start all over again." So Bobbie  
started all over and he said,

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So he said, "All right,  
Bobbie, here's what you do. You get in touch with Brad, send  
a message out to

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[REDACTED]

threw this in. Then he said, "Bobbie, you get in touch  
with Bradley ~~and~~ and you have him send a message out and

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[REDACTED]

Just

like that!" Cutler said, "Yes, sir" and we went away.  
So we went back to Cutler's office. Now Cutler, you see,  
had only been in, what, a month, January 20th to the 12th  
of February? Now this wouldn't have happened three months  
from then. Gosh, no. So we got back and Cutler had  
this telephone on his desk--to the White House, the CIA  
and to Brad<sup>ley</sup>--a completely open phone. He got on the  
phone and got General Bradley and he said, "General  
Bradley, I've got a message here from the President. Mr!

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I'll tell you, going over

there now--I overlapped these two Administrations. Strictly talking about this now from an intelligence point of view. It was quite an awesome thing to see this change of Administrations, like this. On my first trip over there, right after January 20, whether it was three or four days later, people--it was a clean sweep--and you know, there had been somebody in there to try ~~to~~ <sup>Adm</sup> Truman to like you remember ~~xxxx~~ there was a little bad blood there, you remember that?

A. Oh, sure.

D. There were people sitting there who had no idea what that desk was supposed to do. And they would grab people like me, coming over with Mr. Dulles, or anybody, and <sup>just sit down</sup> say, "Look, is this the way you used to do things? What is this guy supposed to do?" and this kind of thing. And a lot of times you wouldn't know. You only knew your little part of the



elephant, you know. But this is our system of government;  
but I often worry about...

- A. Well, these total change/<sup>overs</sup> ~~xxxxxx~~ are/<sup>always very</sup> ~~xxxxxx~~ difficult and sometimes the ~~the~~ arrangements are better than other times. Sometimes the outgoing President is very careful to be sure there is a <sup>nice</sup> overlap period, that everyone ~~xxx~~ is properly instructed, and at other times he isn't and sometimes the incomers don't want to touch this thing.

- 25X1 D. Of course, this [ ] incident upset Mr. Dulles  
25X1 [ ] in more ways than one. He knew that we had to start working out some kind of arrangement with the White House. I can see now and I guess he kind of felt/why the <sup>like</sup> President/<sup>thought he</sup> was sending anybody except himself...it was that important. So we then started and I left up there <sup>then, a</sup> few months later-- [ ] took over and I was reassigned, but I think the next six months or so --~~well~~ well, I'm sure, within three months--this kind of thing wouldn't have happened. They just hadn't got a working mechanism started for this kind of thing-- [ ]

- 25X1 A. What did your role evolve into under Eisenhower? Did you continue to do very much the same thing for the new Director?
- D. I had met Bob Schultz--General Schultz--who was personal aide to the President. He stayed there; retired with

Truman and Eisenhower. As a matter of fact, Nixon--before/Johnson died, he had appointed him special assistant for --it's a big, long name for liaison with former Presidents of the United States. Now Schultz, as I understand, took care of the personal things of the Eisenhower family, like income tax and all that stuff. But he got in pretty deeply with the President on almost--on many, many things <sup>there</sup> to begin with. Now I had met him when General Smith and I went to Baltimore to ride back with President-elect Eisenhower.

End of Tape 1 Side 3 of [ ] interview, Sept 24/73 STATINTL  
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Tape 1, side 4

- (D) So Bob Schultz would call at home; he would call me, for example, they wanted Mrs. Eisenhower, Mamie Eisenhower's personal secretary. He would call me to see if he could ~~for~~ get a security check on her; they were extremely careful. Just because they didn't know <sup>anybody</sup> ~~anyone~~ else to call. So I got to the point where I was a real pivot man there for the first three or four months. And Schultz continued to call me, as a matter of fact he called and wanted to know if <sup>would be</sup> Park Fairfax ~~was~~ a proper place for him to live...the first few months down here. All sorts of things like that, you know. It was hard to make a decision. So I said I happened to know a Congressman who lived over there so it couldn't

(D) be too far off. And sure enough he rented a place over there for the first few months or so. But then it would be on how to get to him, <sup>Cassey</sup>  <sup>or</sup> ~~aper, for~~ a Joint Chiefs paper <sup>to the President,</sup> I mean all sorts of questions.

A. For goodness sakes, it must have represented quite a deal of trouble for you?

D. Well I guess Eisenhower came down with--he was about his old trustworthy aide. I'm sure he ~~just~~ didn't <sup>run wild</sup> there the first few months trying to get things set up for the President. And you know, the President didn't know John Foster Dulles too well. And Adams, & I don't know how much he knew, but, of course, when Governor Adams took over in the White HOuse this was it,  I mean he really hammered things into shape. Took over. No question about it. Just what really Ike wanted.

A. Really ran the staff?

D. It was more of a military staff. After I left up there as being--Special Assistant was my job, to the DDI, although Lofty Becker made certain that my job never changed...I just changed titles. After I left up there personally, I went down ~~there~~ and took over the Presentation Division--the old Situation Room Division we used to call it. And a part of that function grew out of this, was, I guess the kind of thing ~~W~~ I was talking about long ago. You would have

(D) Mr. Dulles--well by this time it had been set up, that Mr. Dulles was not going to brief the President, personally, as Bedell Smith had briefed <sup>Druman</sup> ~~the President~~. But he was to brief him in the whole presence of the National Security Council, once a week, except when he needed to see him about something really hot. And then we found out that we--the topside, Mr. Dulles, Amory, and others, <sup>Sheldon</sup> ~~Chakkin~~, whoever was involved in it--the lower level, and I don't really mean the lower level--<sup>body</sup> anyone in the White House who was not on the National Security Council, just went around not knowing what the hell the world situation was. So I instituted, at their direction, a weekly and it moved up to a bi-weekly--that is, twice a week--briefing of the White House Staff, on which Adams chaired all that, and if it were 8:30 well, boy, everybody was in their seats at 8:25 and Adams was telling me to go ahead. We'd brief and we'd get through and he would say are there any questions and he would handle the questions for the whole group. And if somebody ~~would~~ <sup>ask</sup> a question that he thought was silly, he'd say: "That's silly, don't even try to (answer)"; boy, he really ran a tight house.

We thought this was good; we did this, I would say, for at least a year or maybe longer.

- very much
- A. Well, this is all/the same thing that got handled differently at different times, isn't it?
- D. Yes.

A. There was a period of time when Area Analysts, the Specialists, went down and gave their own briefings?

D. Yes. Yes.

A. Well, if you had two briefings a week, maybe it was that you folks had one briefing that you delivered and then <sup>the</sup> other briefing that week was given by <sup>an</sup> ~~the~~ Analyst from the Desk?

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D. This could be done.

STATINTL

A. I know [ ] was down there and I think [ ] was down there...

D. Well, we could choose, with Sheldon's approval; I don't mean approval, we could work it out with Sheldon. I see the Indo-China war was going hot and heavy too under the French. Dienbienphu happened after Ike took over. The Korean settlement was on its way. So those two factors--the Middle East again, of course--I guess it was some years later about the Lebanon crisis and all that kind of thing, but, we were in charge of getting the briefings and we could again, pick and choose--Sheldon could, really--on who could go. Of course, then, we picked up the expert. I was just actually master of ceremony--was just about all I did.

A. ~~Then~~ <sup>Then</sup> ~~through~~ eventually, though, after a period of time in which the experts gave a lot of these briefings, then it became a matter of potential briefers doing this regularly, I think.

D. This was just a year...when I went to MilDiv...

STATINTL

A. Were you there while [ ] was involved in this? Because

(A) [ ] became a pretty regular briefer at the White House  
...of the White House Staff.

STATINTL D No, no, it was after I moved over to MilDiv. I moved to  
Military Division, let's see, I left the environs of the  
Director's Office, I left the DDI [ ] in 25X1  
I guess it was April or May of 1953. And, it's interesting,  
Fred, the reason I left; I was supposed to set up a briefing  
room in the White House for the President ~~and~~ that never came  
about--we never could find the space. I was to go down to  
Presentation Division and kind of get that rounded out and  
get a little experience on that and maybe take a few of those  
over there to staff that thing. And we went so far as to  
go over and we found the bowling alley that the newsmen had  
~~chipped~~ chipped in together and given to Truman. It was  
a long shotgun, a long narrow thing, and we went over and  
measured that off and actually got some blueprints made  
to make it into a briefing room. Again, Mr. Adams and the  
White House Staff decided they needed it for office space.  
And they took it away from us, so to speak. I don't think  
this briefing room came in for another three or four years.  
A. Well, when in fact did the briefing room come in? *D. I have no idea.* This isn't  
the same thing as the Situation Room, is it?

D. Yes; that's what it was planned to be then. But it might have been three or four years later, I don't know.

25X1

D. Well, anyway, I got off track there, a little bit. Speaking of getting intelligence to the White House, there was another thing we did--started then. As you know, again, I'm not being nasty about this but <sup>just</sup> pure politics. You know the Democrats had been in power an awful long time. So we found ourselves <sup>where</sup> almost all diplomats the world over ~~when~~ <sup>or</sup> we were swept out; either the career ones were being placed at other places, and there was no question about it, a lot of these were political appointees. Well this became a tremendous thing--much bigger than it had been since CIG <sup>or</sup> ~~and~~ CIA had



been set up. So we set up a program to brief all outgoing Ambassadors, from an intelligence point of view and then the DDP from an operational point of view. [REDACTED]

25X1

[REDACTED] do the operations and I was set up to do the intelligence. Now this is not to the White House, but it was an extension of White House policy. So we would have these people come in and <sup>then</sup> we would ~~have~~ get all the area experts and they would brief them for how much they wanted. A lot of these guys were right out of business, you know, and had just read New York Times or Christian Science Monitor, if they were lucky enough; but, anyway, just newspapers. So that was a real--that had to be pretty well coordinated with the White House.

- A. I'll bet that lasted <sup>quite a</sup> ~~xxx~~ long time, didn't it?
- D. It did; well, it took the whole year, I know; I left the Presentation Division in about a year and I went on to MilDiv. And from then on, ~~xxxxxxx~~, I don't know really what happened.
- A. Well, your own opinion, I suppose, is <sup>at</sup> that the Agency ~~is~~ should ~~xxxx~~ maintain a pretty close contact with the White House on <sup>current</sup> ~~xxxx~~ intelligence matters? And either you do this <sup>through</sup> the way that Bedell Smith did with the weekly briefings or ~~is~~ you <sup>do</sup> ~~do~~ it with something like the particular PDB, but you really need to have some personal contact.
- D. Fred, it's my own opinion...of course, I can't <sup>help</sup> ~~have~~ with all my personal prejudice, saying that the better the DCI knows the President, the better it is for the country. I mean, I'm

(D) not being corny, now. I just think that is perfection to me.

For each has a mutual association with each other; there <sup>was</sup> no doubt about it--Truman wanted Bedell Smith to take this job over. He took it over and there was a rapport there that --I'm sure Bedell was quite in the middle between later events of ~~/xxxxxx~~ Ike and Truman. He just was crazy about both people.

No question about it; but I don't--maybe those weekly briefings took an hour of the President's time, maybe nothing <sup>really</sup> significant happened every week, but just that personal contact was there, and could be used, and I just...

A. Probably isn't anything to replace that...

D. And Mr. Dulles found it awfully hard to speak of operational matters with the White House, the National Security Council, -- there were little things that ~~xxxxxx~~ you just didn't want to tell a big group about, like the National Security Council. But this cozy little group of just talking <sup>directly</sup> to the President ...you could speak on any matter. And that kind of contact is irreplaceable.

A. Sure is.

D. And there was none of this going through ~~third~~ <sup>third</sup> parties or whatever--to me it was just perfect. You had the National Security Council there, you had ~~xxxx~~ his hourly guy--I mean the guy who was there every hour, ~~xxxxxx~~ Dennison was there, and of course I want to emphasize again that Bedell Smith used Dennison, I used him; I could call him up and say "Look, Admiral, you got this message..." and he could find it, send that <sup>in</sup> ~~here~~, this kind of thing. Now maybe we didn't press

that hard enough. It comes back to me now--I think that the CIB and all other things going over there, went through Dennison.

A. Yes. That would seem logical.

D. Yes, and he controlled that part of it.

A. Now, he was the main intelligence contact in the White House?

D. Yes. He was the Naval Aide as Harry Vaughn was the Army Aide.

A. Dennison might have succeeded Leahy in this role, because Leahy had been both Roosevelt's and Truman's Naval Aide and Intelligence Aide, I think.

D. Good enough--very good enough. And they had a good, secure place.

25X1

25X1 A.  ?

D. The Air Force man--of course the Defense Act of '48 made the Air Force separate, but I think that he was at most, was, besides, his pilot now. I think Truman for a while used his pilot kind of as a double aide. But I think Truman's first Air Force Aide was a full Colonel who later got to be--I didn't know him, but...

A. Well, it was an exciting time, wasn't it?

D. Yes, it was.

A. A very satisfying experience?

STATINTL

60  
51

- D. It was and, of course, it'll never ~~xx~~ happen again, either because--maybe it shouldn't happen again, Fred. Now go back to the Situation Summary again. That thing was written under such short deadlines--we had all week to do it, but there was always a last minute thing that had to be done. And I suppose it had to be stated that [redacted] and the other people down there just trusted us-- [redacted] was the main one involved--~~We~~ we would coordinate every item we could Thursday night, but we could also change that during the night. ~~Like~~ <sup>And</sup> what ~~xx~~ I said a while ago, you could write something down and get up there and--I will say this, we bent over backwards to make that thing factual. Now under ~~the~~ <sup>our</sup> present situation, with the Kissingers and the people around here, we would say, "there's indications that...", we would never estimate. But we tried to stay with the facts and maybe we felt we shouldn't come to some conclusions...~~just~~ in it instaying [redacted] <sup>with</sup> the facts, but you can bet your life when we were talking with Bedell Smith, he would force us into a conclusion sometime..."What do you think this means?" And this went right on to the top, I'm sure, <sup>in many instances</sup>. Maybe we don't want it that way again. But, I think it would scare the daylights out of me now to do it.
- A. Well, still, the aspect of having the Director have a personal and regular contact each week with the President would always be a good thing, I ~~xxxx~~ should think.

- D. Well, maybe I sound like I'm bragging too much. We weren't talking to a dummy, of course, when we were talking to Bedell Smith. We knew damn well he wasn't going to go off half-cocked, but we did put some ideas into his head that now would take five weeks to coordinate.
- A. Sure, sure.
- D. And maybe that's what they're striving to do here now...during this last few weeks--few months--of coming to some conclusion that if we don't know, those of us who work in this daily; but if you're going to guess, maybe the analyst is the best one to start the guessing.
- A. Yes, sure, probably so. Well, the person who is substantively steeped in the subject is not a bad person to make the guess.
- D. Certainly is not; certainly is not...and one of the things General Smith liked on the military side, and he did this to State on some sides, he was of the opinion that CIA was the place to gather the information from all sources, from all departments, just like our Charter says. Puts them together with enough clout--if clout is the word--with enough knowledge of the situation to go back and hammer it out like on military problems, He asked me one time, "If you don't agree with this military estimate, what'll you do?" Well, we actually would argue with the military on it. But in the final analysis Bedell Smith believed that it was the responsibility of the Pentagon to make Order of Battle Estimates. It was the responsibility of State, then, I think it was then to do political and economic to some extent. And later on we took

on these functions as we moved along, but I think his idea was a group of experts who would know enough about it to screen it, doubt it if necessary, make the judgments to some extent, and let them do the background work. And above all, screen everything going to the President so that he wouldn't have to do his own analysis and he wouldn't be getting the same thing from five or six different places in the Government.

A. Or contradictory things.

D. Or contradictory, as I mentioned a while ago, between classifications--that type of thing.

A. Well, Dave, you certainly covered an awful lot of ground here. You've answered all my essential questions.

D. Well, a lot of this I know is just old wartime stories. I'm sure it's not going to be...as I said, Fred, I don't know whether it's going to be of any help to you or not.

A. Oh, it is. Unquestionably; a great deal of help.

D. I guess we've said this several times: but I guess never in the history of this Agency, or any other place, will, really, the analyst--what he wrote--was going so direct to the White House, or being considered anyway, or whatever.

Now, we briefed--I guess I haven't really covered--maybe we could take another time on the Presidential candidates.

A. Sure; I'd like to do that.

D. Do you want to do that at a later time, or do you want to do it right now?

- A. Well, I'll tell you one thing. I'm not going to have a great deal of tape left.
- D. All right; then let's do that another time. We didn't really cover the period from the last part of '52--we jumped from there to the Ike thing. The briefing of the Presidents--the Presidential candidates, was one of the--we were supposedly the first ones, I think...
- A. That's right.
- D. I think Roosevelt had had some done directly from the White House, but it was the first time CIA had ever been involved in a Presidential briefing...we can talk about that.
- A. I'd like that, sure. Well, thank you very much.
- D. And if we don't get to it, as you recall, I briefed Stevenson from August till November and [ ] briefed Ike<sup>STATINTL</sup> And it was Truman's--Truman approved this--but it was Ike's plan that I was to brief both of them; but it just didn't work out that way. So I'll tell you about that on the next tape, how that came about.
- A. Well, thanks a lot.